In September 2024, Kevin O’ Connell, head coach of the Minnesota Vikings, appeared on the Rich Eisen Show where he criticized organizations for how they develop rookie signal-callers:
“I believe organizations fail young quarterbacks before young quarterbacks fail organizations.”
His quote brings up an interesting point; how many rookie quarterbacks who showed promise in college were failed by their organizations? Teams that finish at the bottom of the standings usually end up with a top-five pick the following spring. But does drafting a quarterback actually solve the problems that made these teams so bad in the first place? And how can organizations properly evaluate a young passer when the supporting cast around him is fundamentally flawed?
This question has haunted the Tennessee Titans for almost a decade now.
Quarterback (QB) Jake Locker (10), a former Titan, was drafted in 2011 and retired in 2015 due to frustration with constant injuries. QB Marcus Mariota (8) was drafted in 2015 with the second overall pick, and he led the team to a playoff win. But, inconsistencies and injuries prevailed and forced the Titans to bench him in favor of QB Ryan Tannehill (17), acquired in a trade with Miami. QB Will Levis (8) was drafted in 2023, and he was benched in 2024 to never see a starting role again. All three quarterbacks were drafted with the chance to potentially be their franchise quarterback. Despite their differing circumstances, all of their tenures were marked by flashes of greatness, followed by a variety of inconsistencies, injuries, and a lingering feeling near the end that Tennessee would once again enter the QB carousel. Seven different coaches coached these four quarterbacks, but none of them could create any sort of consistency within the quarterback room. Then came QB Cam Ward (1).
Drafted number one overall in the 2025 draft out of Miami, Ward’s rookie season brought hope back to Nissan Stadium. He showed flashes of creativity, with off-platform sidearm throws and a knack for improvisation when plays broke down. He also often looked indecisive and scared, as if the game moved a little too fast for him, but these are all normal qualities for a rookie quarterback to have. Most people expected growth when Robert Saleh, the new head coach, hired Brian Daboll to be the offensive coordinator. Daboll is widely credited with the development of QB Josh Allen (Buffalo Bills 17), who had a huge question mark over his head in terms of accuracy coming out of Wyoming, and many were intrigued to see if Ward would flourish in this new scheme. In year two, however, we have seen less of those flashes and more of the inconsistencies that we were hoping a new coaching staff could eliminate. He has a completion percentage of 63.2%, and has thrown for 998 yards, four touchdowns and four interceptions in six games (along with two rushing touchdowns). His season numbers are currently projected as 2828 yards, 11 total touchdowns, and 11 interceptions in 17 games — numbers that will not win you games. In the draft, the Titans added the consensus top wide receiver (WR) in Carnell Tate (14) at pick four, a guard in Fernando Carmona Jr. (66) at pick 142, and a center in Pat Coogan (79) at pick 194. But the offense has still struggled, and if Ward’s season continues this way, it’ll likely be another season they pick top five in the upcoming NFL Draft.
Still, year one of a new system is as much a test of whether the pieces fit as it is a test of the quarterback. A new play-caller can change a scheme in one offseason; he can’t change the players who have to run it, and there isn’t a lot to work with on this roster. Since WR AJ Brown (New England Patriots 1) left, the wide receiver room has not produced enough — their highest total yardage for a WR was 1057 by DeAndre Hopkins (Baltimore Ravens 10) in 2023. Similarly, since running back (RB) Derrick Henry (Baltimore Ravens 22) left, the RB room has not produced — Tony Pollard (20) and Tyjae Spears (2) have shown potential but have split snaps, and the Titans found no consistent success with either’s carries. Despite rebuilding the offensive line room and supplying it with young talent in right tackle (RT) JC Latham (55), right guard (RG) Carmona, and left guard Peter Skoronski (77), the unit has struggled mightily, allowing four sacks in a Week 5 loss against the Houston Texans. Left tackle Dan Moore Jr. (75), was the worst of the bunch, allowing a team-high seven pressures and a sack. Tennessee has not been shy about spending on this offense, but the spending hasn’t worked. The roster construction here has simply not been good enough, and despite this, they expected a young quarterback to come in and be Superman in his rookie year. Is that not complete negligence?
Tennessee has more than just receivers being unable to get separation to blame for its anemic offense. Daboll has designed some unique run plays and play-actions, but the Titans have not been able to execute. In Week 6, Ward got his first win of the season against the Colts despite throwing for close to 100 yards on 11 completions and throwing almost zero balls between the hashes. The Titans repeatedly found themselves in obvious passing situations, allowing the Colts to anticipate the pass and limit what Ward could do. He took an avoidable delay-of-game penalty on third down and threw an interception that appeared to come from a miscommunication with WR Wan’Dale Robinson (4). But there were still flashes of the talent that made him the first overall pick. On one third-and-seven, Ward made a well-timed throw against zone coverage that should have been a first down, only for his receiver to drop it. He also found Tate for a touchdown on a well-designed play-action rollout, and later threw a deep ball to him that drew defensive pass interference and helped set up the go-ahead field goal. This game illustrates the problem with evaluating him right now; he still makes mistakes that a second-year quarterback should be growing out of, but he’s also playing in an offense that has struggled to consistently execute around him.
When Ward was drafted, the team he inherited fielded an offense that ranked 30/32 in offensive expected points added (EPA)/play. EPA is a metric that describes the efficiency of an offense on average on a play-by-play basis: how many points is a decision expected to add based on years of historical data analyzing when other teams made similar/different moves in the same position on a specific play. This invites a useful comparison: when other quarterbacks were thrown into similar situations, how did they fare? Did they develop, or were they thrown to the bench?
QB Jared Goff (Detroit Lions 16) inherited a Los Angeles Rams offense that ranked dead last in offensive EPA/play when he took over in 2016. He went 0–7 as a starter, but head coach Sean McVay’s arrival in 2017 allowed him to flourish, and he threw for 28 touchdowns en route to a 11–5 season finish. He then saw continued success from there as a Ram, and afterwards as a Detroit Lion. QB Sam Darnold (Seattle Seahawks 14) was drafted by a Jets team that had the 22nd ranked offense by EPA/play the year prior, and struggled for years as a Jet and as a Panther before flourishing in Minnesota under Kevin O’Connell and winning the Super Bowl with offensive coordinator Klint Kubiak and the Seattle Seahawks. His passing touchdowns per game went from 0.96 before Minnesota to 2.02 with O’Connell, more than double what it was before.
Some QBs also never reach their full potential, and never become full-time starters in the NFL. QB Josh Rosen is one of the major examples of this. He was drafted by the 2018 Cardinals (that were 31st in EPA/play the year prior) for his throwing mechanics, his short/intermediate accuracy, and his pocket presence. But nothing made him more NFL-ready to scouts than his intelligence; scouts loved his ability to read defenses and understand complex offenses. It never translated to the NFL, however. He threw for 11 touchdowns and 14 interceptions as a starter behind an offensive line that gave up 45 sacks in the 14 games he played, which is 3.2 sacks per game! This is partially Rosen’s fault, however, as he tended to hold onto the ball too long and was indecisive beyond his first read. Regardless, Arizona drafted his replacement in QB Kyler Murray (Minnesota Vikings 1) the next year. (Ironically, Murray also wasn’t re-signed by the Cardinals, and now O’Connell is attempting to revive his career in Minnesota.)
These three cases simply illustrate that the personnel around a player matters just as much as the traits the player has; a quarterback’s early struggles do not necessarily define his ceiling, and an organization’s ability to develop and support him can affect whether he reaches it. Ward also came into the NFL with an impressive skillset and a high level of anticipation only to take over one of the least efficient teams in the league. He is both capable of executing plays that give hope to Tennessee in their pick while also raising legitimate doubts about his ability to process plays, accurate passing, and making sound judgment calls. We just don’t know whether his story will be more similar to Rosen’s or Darnold’s, and he doesn’t necessarily have the skilled players around him for us to judge this appropriately.
Ward may not be the Titans’ QB of the future. His struggles are apparent, and no amount of poor offensive line play or instability in coaching can wash away his missed throws, bad sacks, and poor decisions. Despite this, the Titans have searched for years to figure out who their quarterback should be without solving the issues plaguing the position. With another promising crop of quarterbacks on the way, Tennessee could be tempted to start fresh. But replacing Ward without addressing the problems around him risks repeating the same cycle that landed the team in this predicament. O’Connell’s words should serve as a warning; before Tennessee decides that Cam Ward has failed the organization, it needs to ask if anything would actually be different for the quarterback who replaces him.
